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F or more than three decades the defense of entrapment has suf-fered. This suffering has occurred in many jurisdictions and at all 
levels, it has been especially acute at the 
United States Supreme Court. The high 
watermark for the entrapment defense in 
the Supreme Court was United States v. 
Sherman' back in 1958. The Court there 
reaffirmed its reliance on the subjective, 
predisposition test 2 but condemned the 
behavior of the government and found 
entrapment as a matter of law. This con-
clusion was significant through the con-
duct of the government in Sherman was 
egregious. In the words of Justice O'Con-
nor, the Government agent had repeat-
edly and unsuccessfully coaxed the defen-
dant to buy drugs, ultimately succeeding 
only by playing on the defendant's sym-
pathy." Since Sherman, the Court has 
expressed serious doubts about the 
entrapment defense and has refused to 
apply it in any sort of vigorous fashion.' 
In United States v. Russell 5 government 
agents had been heavily involved in the 
commission of a crime. They supplied 
the defendants with the necessary—but  
difficult to obtain—ingredi-
ent for the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. After 
manufacture of the drug the 
agents arrested the defen-
dants. The Court rejected the 
assertion that the government had 
gone too far. Instead, looking to its pre-
disposition test, it noted that "entrapment 
is a relatively limited defense." The con-
duct of the government really was amaz-
ingly intertwined with the criminal behav-
ior of the defendant. The Court, though, 
was far less concerned with the govern-
ment's actions than with the defendant's 
state of mind. The one positive feature of 
the opinion was that it recognized that in 
certain cases the behavior of the gov-
ernment may be so improper as to raise 
due process concerns' 
The defense fared no better a few years 
later with the decision in Hampton v. Unit-
ed States. 8 Government behavior there 
went even farther than in Russell, for the 
defendant claimed that the heroin he was 
accused of selling to undercover agents 
had in fact been supplied to him by anoth-




that the defendant 
was predisposed and 
rejected the entrapment claim. Indeed, 
perhaps the most telling aspect of Hamp-
ton was the view of three members of the 
Court' that the Due Process Clause would 
have little impact in the entrapment area 
and would only "come into play when the 
Government activity in question violates 
some protected right of the defendant."' 
From 1976 until 1992, the Supreme Court 
had issued opinions in no major entrap-
ment decision. Moreover, after World War 
II the only genuinely supportive entrap-
ment opinion was Sherman, decided 34 
years ago." Its lead in limiting the appli- 
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[Jacobson] also requires Judges 
to be certain that when we con-
vict an individual of a serious 
crime the conviction is based upon 
that person's own improper pur-
pose, not those of government 
agents. 
cation 
of the entrap- 
ment defense has been 
widely followed throughout the 
country in both federal and state awns. 
The federal courts which have allowed a 
variety of remarkably intense involve-
ments by the government in criminal 
behavior without seeing entrapment," 
have been reluctant to find much role for 
the Due Process Clause" and have gen-
erally been resistant to defense claims of 
entrapment." 
'The record on the entrapment defense 
in the state courts is more mixed. Some 
states utilize the objective entrapment test, 
focusing on police conduct; they have 
been much more receptive to defense 
claims." In the states which follow the 
predisposition test, however, the courts 
have echoed the tone i f not the specific 
holdings of the Supreme Court in restricting 
of the defense." While the 
the application 
due process contention in the state 
courts has been somewhat more suc-
cessful than in the federal courts" gener-
ally the past 34 years have not been kind 
to defense claims of entrapment across 
the nation. 
I write this very soon after the decision 
was announced; still, it is fair to say that 
the Supreme Court's opinion in Jacobson 
v. United States 18 will be an extremely pos-
itive change of pace for defense lawyers 
and a very chilly disappointment for pros-
ecuting attorneys. It is certainly too early 
to determine if the case will have dramatic, 
long-term impact in the entrapment area 
generally, or be limited to extended sting 
operations. It is, however, a significant 
view of the Supreme Court's disgust with 
at least certain governmental activities in 
ferreting out crime. 
Jacobson v. United States 
Goverment agents were relentless in 
their pursuit of the defendant. They 
initially came across him when they closed 
down a bookstore in California. In 1984 
he had ordered two magazines, contain-
ing photographs of nude preteen and 
teen-aged boys, from the bookstore. His 
name thus was on its mailing list. At the 
time of the 1984 order the purchase of 
those magazines was lawful."" The court 
in its introductory section of the opinion 
gives a flavor for what took place after 
the agents targeted Jackson. "There fol-
lowed over the next two and a half years 
years, repeated efforts by two government 
agencies, through five fictitious organizations 
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Did the United States Supreme Court 
change the test for predisposition? 
Not at all. 
 and a bogus pen pal, to explore peti-
tioner's willingness to break the new law 
by ordering sexually explicit photographs 
of children through the mail.' 20 The efforts 
began in early 1985 and ended more than 
two years later when the defendent pur-
chased materials that the government had 
sent him through the mails. 21 The efforts 
included a letter from the "American 
Hedonist Society" espousing the view that 
people should have the "right to read 
what we desire, the right to discuss sim-
ilar interests with those who share our 
philosophy, and finally that we have the 
right to seek pleasure without restrictions 
being placed on us by outdated puritan 
morality." 22 Jacobson also received a solic-
itation from a "prohibited mail specialist" 
in the postal service posing as a repre-
sentative of the Midlands Data Research 
Company. He wrote to the defendant 
seeking responses from those who 
"believe in the joys of sex and the com-
plete awareness of those lusty and youth-
ful lads and lassies of the neophyte [sic] 
age."23 Still another government-created 
group called the "Heartland Institute for 
a New Tomorrow" contacted Jacobson 
indicating that it was "an organization 
founded to protect and promote sexual 
freedom and freedom of choice." 24 Jacob-
son also received personal letters from 
the above-mentioned "prohibited mail 
specialist" writing under the pseudonym 
of "Carl Long." After writing two return 
letters, Jacobson discontinued the corre-
spondence. Other letters to him followed, 
other fictitious organizations contacted 
him. It was not until the "Far Eastern Trad-
ing Company Limited" wrote him, solic-
iting his order for sexually explicit mate-
rials, that he ordered magazines depicting 
young boys engaged in various sexual 
activities. 25 
The defendant was convicted and his 
conviction was affirmed on appeal by the 
Eighth Circuit sitting en banc.26 For the 
Supreme Court the issue was a simple one. 
Had the prosecution demonstrated, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defen-
dant was predisposed to purchase through 
the mails illegal pornographic materials? 
The answer was a resounding, "No." 
If the opinion simply involves eviden-
tiary considerations relating to the pre-
disposition element, why has there been 
such a controversy surrounding the opin-
ion? One reason for the furor in connec-
tion with the opinion is that there are a 
few misconceptions about the Court's 
holding. The Court did not decide that 
before targeting an individual agents must 
have some individualized suspicion that  
the person is engaging in criminal behav-
ior or is likely to do so.27 Indeed, Justice 
White's majority opinion expressly noted 
that such individualized suspicion would 
not be necessary. 
Had the agents in this case simply 
offered petitioner the opportunity to 
order child pornography through the 
mails, and petitioner—who must be 
presumed to know the law—had 
promptly availed himself of this crim-
inal opportunity, it is unlikely that 
his entrapment defense would have 
warranted a jury instruction. 28 
The case also did not indicate a will-
ingness of the Court to have the judicia-
ry actively involved either in regulating 
police conduct or in routinely finding 
entrapment as a matter of law. Justice 
White pointed out that this was an extra-
ordinary case requiring reversal because 
at the time Jacobson finally placed his 
order "he had already been the target of 
26 months of repeated mailings and com-
munications from government agents and 
fictitious organizations." 
Still, the opinion in Jacobson is a strong 
one, and one that will likely have an 
important impact throughout the crimi-
nal justice system. In three ways, the case 
is of significance. 30 First, it demonstrated 
that the concept of entrapment as a mat-
ter of law is alive and well. Second, it indi-
cated that the courts should and will care-
fully scrutinize evidence of predisposition 
to make sure that the government's bur-
den has been satisfied. Third, the timing 
of the predisposition inquiry is clarified 
so that the question must be focused on 
the moment before government contact 
rather than before solicitation of an ille-
gal act. Let us turn to a brief discussion of 
each of these areas. 
Entrapment As A Matter Of Law 
The Supreme Court in reversing Jacob-
son's conviction did not send it back for 
a retrial or an evidentiary hearing. The 
Court did not conclude that the charging 
document was faulty, that the instruc- 
tions were incomplete, or that the trial 
proceedings were flawed. Instead, the 
Justices found entrapment as a matter of 
law and dismissed the case against the 
defendant. In light of the trial evidence, 
this result may not seem surprising. Con-
sidering, however, how rarely entrap-
ment has been found as a matter of law 
in recent years, it is a striking decision. 
Some courts have doubted whether trial 
judges could find entrapment as a mat-
ter of law." While most state and feder-
al courts have assumed that a trial judge 
could find entrapment as a matter of law, 
in all but the most extreme cases courts 
have not been willing to find the defense 
as a matter of law." Thus, this statement 
in Jacobson was very welcome and 
important: "The prosecution failed, as a 
matter of law, to adduce evidence to sup-
port the jury verdict that the condition 
was predisposed, independent of the 
Government's acts and beyond reason-
able doubt ..." 33  
The Government's Predisposition 
Burden 
The prosecution believed that it present-
ed strong evidence of Jacobson's predis-
position. The evidence was grouped 
into two time periods: the time before 
government contacts with him, and the 
time during its lengthy investigation. 
The majority of the Court was, howev-
er, not impressed by the prosecution 
presentation . 34  
The early evidence of predisposition—
prior to any government contact— was 
quite limited. It consisted of the defen-
dant's 1984 magazine order. The Court 
ruled that these magazines were lawful-
ly protected at the time that he ordered 
them so that the order "does little" to sus-
tain the predisposition requirement." 
Moreover, the fact that the defendant 
enjoyed reading sexually explicit maga-
zines by itself could not be sufficient. 
[The order of the magazines] is scant if 
any proof of petitioner's predisposition 
to commit an illegal act, the criminal 
character of which the defendant is pre- 
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sumed to know. It may indicate a pre-
disposition to view sexually-oriented 
photographs that are responsive to his 
sexual taste; but evidence that merely 
indicates a generic inclination to act 
within a broad range, not all of which 
is criminal, is of little probative value 
in establishing predisposition.% 
This conclusion by the Court means a 
great deal. If the Court had decided oth-
erwise, could predisposition then be sat-
isfied with a showing of other sorts of 
tastes which many might find offensive? 
Would, for instance, the purchase of law-
ful, generally available, but sexually explic-
it magazines be sufficient? What of mag-
azines promoting the legalization of drugs, 
the ending of restrictions on weapons, 
etc.? The possibilities would be endless. 
It is good to see the Court unwilling to 
speak of predisposition when dealing with 
broad, "generic" categories. 
With regard to the evidence during the 
investigation, the Court was also not 
moved. The agents' pursuit of the defen-
dant was intense and lengthy; it was specif-
ically designed to exploit what they 
believed to be his tastes. His responses 
during this two and half year-period were 
not indicative of a predisposition, they 
"were at most indicative of certain per-
sonal inclinations, including a predispo-
sition to view photographs of preteen sex 
and a willingness to promote a given agen-
da by supporting lobbying organiza-
tions."37 The Court could not find this to 
be evidence of predisposition to violate 
the law. Its holding was bolstered when 
the Justices looked to the agents' fervent 
campaign which "exerted substantial pres-
sure on petitioner to obtain and read such 
material as part of a fight against censor-
ship and the infringement of individual 
rights."' True, the defendant responded 
quickly to the ultimate solicitation to pur-
chase illegal magazines through the mails. 
This response, however, was not deemed 
sufficient to establish predisposition 
because it "came only after the Govern-
ment had devoted two and half years to 
convincing him that he had or should have 
the right to engage in the very behavior 
prescribed by law."' 
Redefining The Predisposition 
Time Period? 
Perhaps the most debated feature of Jacob-
son was the view of the dissenters that the 
Court changed the time element for the 
entrapment defense. That is, the question 
can be phrased as "whether a suspect is 
predisposed before the government 
induces the commission of the crime, [or 
whether he was predisposed] before the 
government makes initial contact with 
him."'" In a case such as Jacobson the dif-
ference between the two approaches is 
of real importance. Clearly the defendant's 
ready response to the ultimate solicitation 
would indicate at least a triable issue on 
the question of predisposition if the issue 
is the moment of solicitation. By focusing 
attention on the time before the initial gov-
ernment contact, two and half years ear-
lier than the solicitation, however, the pre-
disposition evidence is far more 
questionable. The evidence is, as the Court 
correctly held, insufficient as a matter of 
law. 
Did the United States Supreme Court 
change the test for predisposition? Not at 
all. Justice White properly stated that the 
issue has always been "whether the Gov-
ernment carried its burden of proving that 
petitioner was predisposed to violate the 
law before the Government intervened. 
The dissent is mistaken in claiming this 
is an innovation in entrapment law and 
in suggesting that the Government's con-
duct prior to the moment of solicitation 
is irrelevant."41 The majority cited the 
Court's opinion in Sorrells v. United 
States. 42 Sixty years earlier the Supreme 
Court wrote that an individual could not 
be punished "for an alleged offense which 
is the product of the creative activity of 
its own officials ... [the Government] is 
in no position to object to evidence of the 
activities of its representatives in relation 
to the accused."43 
While the Court did not in fact change 
the definition of predisposition the mes-
sage it sent out is unmistakable. If gov-
ernment agents are going to engage in 
long term operations, they must be pre-
pared to prove at trial that the accused's 
state of mind results from his own activi-
ties rather than from the process of gov-
ernment involvement. In short, the pros-
ecution will have to offer evidence of 
predisposition relating to the time before 
any government contact or inducement. 
This requirement is as it should be. The 
key question of the subjective test relates 
to the defendant's predisposition to com-
mit the crime. We want to focus our atten-
tion on the individual's state of mind, his 
behavior, his plans. Once we have intense 
government involvement intertwined with 
the individual it becomes impossible to 
decide whether the intent originated with 
the agents or with the defendant. This 
becomes clear if we look to the time of 
solicitation rather than initial contact. Such 
a result would conflict with the condem- 
nation in Sorrells of law enforcement tech-
niques which "implant in the mind of an 
innocent person the disposition to com-
mit the alleged offense and induce its com-
mission in order [to] prosecute." 44 
Conclusion 
Justice White's opinion in Jacobson is a 
refreshing reaffirmation of the validity and 
importance of the entrapment defense. 
The decision did not create new law, it 
did not strain prior interpretations. What 
it does, however, is concentrate our atten-
tion on the propriety of long-term gov-
ernment undercover operations. It also 
requires judges to be certain that when 
we convict an individual of a serious crime 
the conviction is based upon that person's 
own improper purpose, not those of gov-
ernment agents. Strong language in this 
area has been missing from United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence for more 
than three decades. Its return is to be 
applauded. 
When the Government's quest for con-
victions leads to the apprehension of 
an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, 
if left to his own devices, likely would 
have never run afoul of the law, the 
courts should intervene. 45  
Notes 
1.356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
2. Over the vigorous dissent of Justice Frank-
furter who wished to adopt the objective test, eval-
uating appropriate police conduct. 
3.Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 
1544 (1992) [O'Connor, J., dissenting]. 
4. I put to the side Matthews v. United States, 
485 U.S. 58 (1988). It rejected the view that the 
entrapment defense could only be raised if the 
defendant admitted the underlying crime. The 
case has far more to do with notions of proce-
dure involving inconsistent defenses than it does 
with the defense of entrapment. To be sure, the 
opinion of the Court in Jacobson mentions 
Matthews but once. 
5. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
6. Id at 435. 
7. 'While we may someday be presented with 
a situation in which the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents is so outrageous that due process 
principles would absolutely bar the Government 
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a con-
viction, the instant case is distinctly not of that 
breed." Id. at 431-32. 
8. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
9. Justice Rehnquist joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice White. 
10.425 U.S. 490-91. On this point, no other 
members of the Court were in agreement. Indeed, 
Justices Powell and Blackmun specially concurred 
leaving the due process question open Essen-
tially they rejected the idea that "the concept of 
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1992 THE CHAMPION 11 
  
fundamental fairness inherent in the guarantee of 
due process would never prevent the conviction 
of a predisposed defendant, regardless of the out-
rageousness of police behavior in light of the sur-
rounding circumstances." Id. at 492 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
11. See Note 4, supra. 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 
578 (3rd Cir. 1982) [the ABSCAM prosecutions]; 
United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762 (2nd Cir. 
1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1193 (1985) [govern-
ment heavily involved in breaking into a bank]; 
United States v. Orton, 742 F. Supp. 562 (D. Ore. 
1990) [mail order child pornography solicitation]. 
13.Indeed, some judges have expressed doubt 
as to whether the outrageous government con-
duct doctrine of the Due Process Clause is any 
longer viable. See, especially, Judge Easterbrook's 
concurring opinion in United States v. Miller, 891 
F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1989). But see Marcus, 
The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases, 
the Journey Back, 27 American Criminal L. Rev. 
457 (1991). 
14.It can be argued, however, that the entrap-
ment defense has a much better rate of success 
with members of the public than members of the 
judiciary. Certainly, the jury verdicts in the John 
DeLorean and Marion Barry cases would support 
such a view. 
15. See, e.g., State v. Juliet, 475 N.W. 2d 786 
(Mich. 1991); State v. Hunter, 586 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 
1991); Waschoe County v. Hawkins, 752 P.2d 769 
(Nev. 1988). 
16. See, e.g., State v. Kim, 779 P.2d 512 (Mont. 
1989) [sheriff's deputies solicited acts of prostitu-
tion at sauna massage business]; Gilley v. State, 
535 N.E. 2d 130 (Ind. 1989) [government active- 
ly involved in the drug offense]; Harrison v. State, 
442 A. 2d 1377 (Del. 1982) [government agent 
encouraged defendant to bring drugs into the state 
prison]. 
17. See, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 406 N.Y. 5.2d 
714 (N.Y. 1978); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 
500 A. 2d 853 (Pa. 1985); State v. Glosson, 462 So. 
2d 1082 (Fla. 1985). 
18. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992). 
19.Soon thereafter, the receipt of such sexu-
ally explicit materials involving minors became 
illegal. Id. at 1538. 
20. Id. 
21. At the time of his arrest, a search of his 





25.In one of the great ironies of the case, the 
government in that solicitation asked Jacobson to 
sign an affirmation that he was "not a law enforce-
ment officer or agent of the U.S. Government act-
ing in an undercover capacity for the purpose of 
entrapping Far Eastern Trading Company, its 
agents or customers." Id at 1539. 
26. The panel decision in the Eighth Circuit 
had reversed; it required a reasonable suspicion 
basis before the targeting of an individual would 
be allowed. This requirement was rejected by the 
court en bane. 
27.The dissenting Justices, in an opinion by 
Justice O'Connor, were concerned that the result 
of the Court's decision would be construed as 
fashioning just such a requirement. 
The rule that preliminary Government contact 
had created predisposition has the potential 
to be misread by lower courts as well as crim-
inal investigators as requiring that the Gov-
ernment must have sufficient evidence of a 
defendant's predisposition before it ever seeks 
to contact him. Surely the Court cannot intend 
to impose such a requirement, for it would 
mean that the Government must have a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity before 
it begins an investigation, a condition that we 
have never before imposed. 
Id at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). [Emphasis 
in original.] 
28. Id. at 1541. 
29. Id. 
30.Hopefully, it is also significant because the 
majority opinion had in its voting block the two 
newest members of the Court, Justices Souter and 
Thomas. 
31.A few courts have made the statement that 
there could not be entrapment as a matter of law. 
The leading case is United States v. Andrews, 765 
F.2nd 1491, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985): "The doctrine 
of entrapment as a matter of law did not survive 
the Supreme Court's opinion in Hampton v. Unit-
ed States." A more accurate view was taken by 
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Nations, 764 
F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1985): 
In essence, the jury must find that the defen-
dant's culpable intent originated with the 
defendant and was not the result of the acts 
of Government's agents. Thus, to declare 
entrapment as a matter of law requires the 
conclusion that a reasonable juror could not 
find that the Government discharged its bur-
den of proof. 
The Court in Andrews seemed to be confusing 
the doctrine of entrapment as a matter of law with 
the view that supplying drugs as such does not 
constitute entrapment as a matter of law. The lat-
ter point was the holding of the Supreme Court 
in Russell and Hampton but it did not go any fur-
ther than the narrow fact patterns presented there. 
32. See generally, Marcus, The Entrapment 
Defense (The Michie Company 1989), Chapter 6. 
33. 112 S. Ct. at 1543. 
34.The dissenters, Justice O'Connor joined by 
the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Scalia, 
strongly disagreed with the majority's character-
ization of the evidence. They would have found 
sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's verdict. 
Id at 1547 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. at 1542. 
36. Id. at 1541. 
37. Id. at 1542. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 1543. 
40. Id. at 1545. (O'Connor, J., dissenting.) 
41. Id. at 1541, n. 2. 
42. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
43. Id. at 451. 
44. Id. at 442. 
45. 112 S. Ct. at 1543. 
12 THE CHAMPION SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 199 
